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Wireless networking is an emerging technology that allows users to access information 
and services anywhere regardless of their geographic location.  Mobile Ad hoc Network 
(MANET) is one of the most significant technologies among various wireless 
communication technologies. In MANETs, all nodes are mobile and can be connected 
dynamically using wireless link in a random manner.  All nodes in MANETs behave as 
routers and take part in discovery and maintenance of routes to other nodes in the 
network. They communicate directly with each other only if they are within the 
communication range. However, they rely on each other and forward packets when they 
are out of communication ranges. MANETs are infrastructure-less network and have self-
configuring features that make them suitable for many critical applications, such as 
military and emergency applications. However, these features make them also vulnerable 
for all types of passive and active attacks because of open environment, the rapidly 
changing topology and the decentralization of nodes in MANETs. In addition, most of 
the proposed MANET protocols assume that all nodes in the network are cooperative, 
and do not address security issues in MANETs. Since most of the proposed existing 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) of MANETs are based on Watchdog technique, we 
study the behavior of the Watchdog technique, and propose a solution for its three 
significant problems, namely: receiver collision, limited transmission power and 
collaborative attacks (collusion attack), especially when there are two consecutive 
collaborative malicious nodes in a path. To demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed 
system, it is implemented and tested under various scenarios using NS2 simulator. To 
validate the results achieved, we compared our results with the results of AACK IDS 
technique. 
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 ملخص الرسالة
 
 ل: عبد السلام سالم سعيد  باسباعالاسم الكام
 
 نظام كشف التطفل للأعتداءات التعاونيه في الشبكات اللاسلكيه المتحركه :عنوان الرسالة
 
 شبكات حاسوب التخصص:
 
 2211مارس  12ة : تاريخ الدرجة العلمي
 
التي تسمح للمستخدمين بالوصول إلى المعلومات والخدمات في أي  المستجدهالتكنولوجيا  هيالشبكات اللاسلكية 
) هي واحدة من الشبكه اللاسلكيه المتحركه( الشبكه اللاسلكيه المتحركهمكان بغض النظر عن موقعهم الجغرافي. 
العقد هي  ، كافة في الشبكه اللاسلكيه المتحركهالتقنيات الأكثر أهمية بين مختلف تقنيات الاتصالات اللاسلكية . 
في الشبكه لاسلكي بطريقة عشوائية. جميع العقد  رابطباستخدام  مباشرالمتنقلة و يمكن ان تكون مرتبطة بشكل 
موجهات و يشارك في اكتشاف وصيانة الطرق المؤدية إلى العقد الأخرى في تعمل ك اللاسلكيه المتحركه
تعتمد على بعضها البعض ولكنها نطاق الاتصال .  تواصل مباشرة مع بعضها البعض إذا كانت داخلالعقد تالشبكة.
هي شبكة البنية التحتية أقل ولها ميزات تكوين  الشبكات اللاسلكيه المتحركهخارج نطاقات الاتصالات.  تكونعندما 
 الذات التي تجعلها مناسبة لكثير من التطبيقات الهامة ، مثل التطبيقات العسكرية و حالات الطوارئ. ومع ذلك ، هذه
بسرعة  المتغيرهفتوحة ، الم تهاالميزات تجعلها عرضة أيضا لجميع أنواع الهجمات السلبية والإيجابية بسبب بيئ
الشبكه اللاسلكيه .بالإضافة إلى ذلك، فإن معظم بروتوكولات  وعدم وجود المركزيه في الشبكات اللاسلكيه المتحركه
كه اللاسلكيه القضايا الأمنية في الشب ولا تعالح  ،ه وايجابيهمتعاونتفترض أن جميع العقد في الشبكة هي  المتحركه
هذه ندرس سلوك في هذا البحث نحن ، الموجوده تعتمد على تقينيهة الوتش دوقلأن معظم النظم و. المتحركه
والهجمات  التحكم في الاشاره المحدودهوهي: استقبال الاصطدام،  حل لثلاث مشاكل هامه قترح ن، والتقينه 
في المسار. لإثبات ه متتاليه وتعاونخبيثه مونية ( الهجوم التواطؤ ) ، وخاصة عندما تكون هناك عقدتين التعا
ومن اجل .  2-SNالمحاكي  واختباره تحت السيناريوهات المختلفة باستخدامهتنفيذ تمجدوى نظامنا المقترح، 
 .جمينتدطريقة الآدابتف اكنولومع نتائج ها نتائجلهذه التقينه قمنا بمقارنة حقق من صحة النتائج الت
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1 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Mobile Ad-hoc Networks Overview 
Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANETs) refers to a collection or group of wireless 
mobile nodes communicating with each other via bi-directional wireless links. Each node 
has both a transmitter and receiver to communicate either directly or indirectly. Unlike 
traditional wireless networks, MANETs don’t depend on fixed network infrastructure 
such as base stations or access points. As a result, MANETs are used in a military and 
temporary networks for a quick deployment and self- organized networks for specific 
purpose and limited period of time. In MANETs, nodes are free to move arbitrarily inside 
the network [1] and they have limited transmission range to communicate together. 
Nodes in MANETs are decentralized, self-organizing, self-configuring and cooperate 
with each other to manage and forward the packets from source to destination without 
depending on fixed infrastructure. Thus, nodes in MANETs operate as router by routing 
the packets of other nodes. Therefore, there are mainly two types of MANETs: single hop 
and multi-hop networks. In single hop MANET, there are no intermediate nodes and each 
node can communicates with other nodes in its transmission range, for example using 
Bluetooth. On the other hand, if the destination node is outside the source node’s wireless 
transmission range, MANET is called multi-hop MANET, where nodes rely on others to 
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communicate with nodes that are out of their transmission range. More details about 
MANETs and their related researches can be found in [2] [3] [4] [5]. 
There are several applications for MANETs. It was developed for military or 
police purposes [6][7]. In addition, MANETs require minimal configuration and fast 
deployment that make them proper for using in emergency circumstances where an 
infrastructure is unavailable or infeasible, for example in case of earthquakes or other 
natural disasters [6][8]. Moreover, MANETs can be used in civilian and commercial 
uses. For example, in a conference, a group of people use ad-hoc networks to 
communicate with each other and exchange data by using their difference devices. 
Finally, in MANETs, one of the most appealing ad-hoc applications is the sensor 
networks. Sensor networks have a lot of potential applications, so they have been 
addressed by many researchers in recent years. A more details about sensor networks and 
their applications can be found in [9][7].   
MANETs have several characteristics [10][7] include: 
 Autonomous: Each node in MANET is autonomous and works as router and host. 
 Decentralized: MANET is distributed in its operation and functionalities, such as 
routing, host configuration and security. For instance, MANET cannot have a 
centralized firewall. 
 Multi-hop: If the source and destination of a message is out of the radio range of one 
node, a multi-hop routing is necessary to forward the data. 
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 Changing topology: Nodes are mobile and can join or leave the network at any time; 
therefore, the topology is dynamic. 
 Unstable link bandwidth: The stability, capacity and reliability of wireless link are 
always lower than wired links. 
 Limit resources: The mobile nodes are often light weight, with less powerful CPU, 
memory and power. 
 Open medium: Due to the infrastructure-less in MANETs and free movement. 
In term of merits, MANETs have three merits over wired networks [7] include: 
 Regardless geographic position, MANETs provide access to information and 
services.  
 MANETs can be setup anywhere and anytime.  
 MANETs work without need to pre-existing infrastructures. 
On the other hand, MANETs have several disadvantages or demerits [7] include: 
 Resources limitation leads to limited security problem. 
 MANETs are much vulnerable to attacks than wired networks due to lack of 
authorization facilities. 
 MANETs have unpredictable time topology as result of network dynamic topology 
and this lead to hard detection of malicious nodes. 
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  Security protocols of wired networks cannot be applied for MANETs since MANETs 
have different architectures than wired networks. 
1.2. Routing Protocol in Mobile Ad hoc NETworks 
In this section, we discuss different proposed types of routing protocol that are 
designed mainly for MANETs. At the end, we describe DSR protocol as used protocol in 
this research. 
1.2.1. Overview of Routing Protocol in MANETs 
There are many routing protocols proposed for MANETs and according to their 
routing algorithms, they are divided to three main categories: proactive, reactive, and 
hybrid [11] as shown in Figure 1-1. For proactive routing protocols, the routing protocol 
find paths to all nodes in the network even if there is no packet ready to be sent and keep 
updating all these paths regularly after certain period of time. As a result, they waste 
limited bandwidth. For example, Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector routing 
protocol (DSDV) [12], the Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) [12] and Cluster head 
Gateway Switch Routing protocol (CGSR) [13].  
In contrast, in reactive routing protocols, the routing protocol reduces the routing 
overhead by updating route information only when there is demand for data transmission 
without need for periodically updates of the paths when there is no new traffic or change 
in network topology, such as Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol 
(AODV) [14], the Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) [15], and the 
Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) [16].  
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Lastly, hybrid routing protocols combine proactive and reactive methods to find 
efficient routes. For example, ZHLS [17] is a typical example of hybrid routing protocols. 
It divides the whole network into several non-overlapping zones and it works as proactive 
if the traffic destination is within the same zone of the source. However, it works as 
reactive to find the zone ID of the destination in whole network. 
In this research, we concentrate on reactive protocols, especially DSR protocol due to its 
efficiency, dynamic nature, wider acceptance and the consideration for standardization.  
A summary of MANETs proposed routing protocols are shown in Figure 1-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  1-1: MANETs Routing Protocols 
 
1.2.2. DSR Protocol  
DSR stand for Dynamic Source Routing protocol [16] and it is an example of reactive 
routing protocol. It is designed to manage multi-hop MANETs and it has two main 
functions, named, Route Discovery and Route Maintenance. 
Example: 
ZHLS 
Example: 
DSDV, WRP, 
etc. 
MANETs Routing Protocols 
Example: 
AODV, DSR, 
etc. 
Proactive 
{1} 
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DSR protocol performs Route Discovery when a node wants to send a packet to a 
destination that does not have a route to it [7]. Figure 1-2 shows example of Route 
Discovery, if node S has a packet wants to send to node D. In this case, if node S has in 
his Route Cache a route to destination node D, this route is immediately used. However, 
if node S does not have a route in its Route Cache for the destination node D, the Route 
Discovery protocol is started by node S (initiator): 
1.  Node S will send a broadcast Route Request packet (RREQ) to its neighbor.  
2. Node B will receive the RREQ message from S. Node B will check if it has recently 
received the same RREQ from the same target or if its address is already added to the 
RREQ’s record. If so, node B discards the RREQ. 
3. If node B is the target (destination) of the RREQ, it will send back Route Reply packet 
(RREP) to node S as unicast packet over the reverse path of RREQ packet that is 
received. However, if node B is not the target of the RREQ and its address still not 
listed in the RREQ’s record, node B will append its address to the RREQ packet and 
rebroadcast the RREQ packet to their neighbor except the initiator (node S). 
4. Finally, the RREQ packet is received by the destination D, the destination D will send 
unicast Route Reply packet (RREP) back to node S over the reverse path of RREQ 
packet that is received. The RREP packet contains a list of best paths from the 
initiator node S to the destination node D. Then, the initiator node S caches this route 
in its Route Cache and uses this route to send subsequence packets to this destination 
(node D) in future.  
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Figure  1-2: Route Discovery Procedure 
 
On the other hand, DSR performs Route Maintenance to discover link failure on an active 
path, where the source node informed of the link failure and updates it routing cache 
appropriately. Figure 1-3 shows example of Route Maintenance, if node C does not 
receive an acknowledgement from node D after some number of requests, it returns a 
RouteError message to the initiator S. As soon as node S receives the RouteError 
message from node C, it deletes the broken-link-route from its Route Cache. If node S 
has another route to node D, it sends the packet immediately using this new route [7]. 
Otherwise the initiator S is starting the Route Discovery process again. 
 
 
 
Figure  1-3: Route Maintenance Procedure 
S B C D 
Error Message 
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Both DSR’s functions, Route Discovery and Route Maintenance, operate on demand 
manner to reduce routing overhead by updating route information only when there is 
required for data transmission without need for periodically updates of the paths when 
there is no new traffic or change in network topology. 
1.3. Intrusion Detection Systems in MANETs 
In this section, we discuss different proposed Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) that are 
designed mainly for MANETs. Lastly, we describe packet dropping attacks in MANETs. 
1.3.1. Overview of Intrusion Detection Systems in MANETs 
MANETs are more vulnerable to attacks than wired networks due to their open 
medium and dynamic change topology that enable attacks to enter network without being 
detected [7]. Thus, security of MANETs has become one of the primary researches 
concerns. In general, security threats or attacks in MANETs divided into active and 
passive attacks [7]. Passive attack: It does not disrupt the operations of network. It 
includes traffic analysis; snooping; monitoring and eavesdropping. For example, packets 
containing secret information might be eavesdropped, and lead to a violation of 
confidentiality. However, active attack attempts to alter or destroy of data being sent on 
the network. It includes injecting packets to invalid destinations into the network; 
modifying the contents of packets; deleting packets and impersonating other nodes 
violate availability and integrity [18][7]. Another classification of attacks is external and 
internal attacks [19]. In external attacks, misbehaving nodes that don’t belong to 
particular network perform attacks on that network. On the other hand, unlike external 
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attacks, internal attacks carried out by misbehaving nodes that belong to particular 
network. Security levels in MANETs are divided into two levels, named, first layer of 
defense and second layer of defense [20]. The first layer of defense is represented usually 
as Instruction Prevention Systems (IPSs), which are software that is able to detect and 
stop possible incidents of external attacks once they enter into the networks, such as 
cryptography and authentication. But most of these security mechanisms suffer from late 
detection of attacks and become useless when the misbehaving nodes already enter the 
network or attacker compromised some nodes inside the network [21]. As a result, the 
first layer of defense, IPSs, becomes ineffective since the internal attacks are performed 
by misbehaving nodes inside the network. Here is where the intrusion detection system 
(IDS) comes in [22].  Unlike the first layer of defense, Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs) represent the second layer of defense and they are able to detect internal attacks. 
The IDS is defined as the process of monitoring the occurring events inside a computer 
system or network and collect activity information for possible events. Then, IDS 
analyzes this data to determine if there any malicious activity that violate network 
security rules. Once IDS detects any malicious activity in the network, it generates alarm 
or initiates proper response to detected malicious activity. It acts as a great complement 
to the existing prevention systems.  
There are many researchers [20][23] have classified existing IDSs based on data 
collected mechanism to either host-based or network-based IDSs. For host-based IDSs, 
they specify intrusion on the bounder of a host machine by analyzing the operating 
system’s audit paths or system and application logs. However, network-based IDSs 
specify intrusion on the bounder of a network by analyzing captured packets on 
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network’s traffics. More classifications of IDSs based on detection mechanisms [20] as 
follow: 
a.  Signature-based (Misuse detection model) detection: It compares captured 
data to known threat signatures to specify intrusion. It is very effective and 
efficient to detect known attacks and produces less false positive rates. However, 
it is ineffective and inefficient to detect unknown threats. In addition, it still 
suffers from detection at complex communications, such as detect threats that 
comprise multiple events. Furthermore, it fails to detect new kind of attacks like 
virus detection system. 
b. Anomaly-based detection: It keeps normal profiles (normal behavior) of users 
and compares them to captured data over a period of time to identify intrusion. It 
deals with any activity that deviates from the baseline of the system as possible 
intrusion and then informs system administrator or start suitable response. It is 
effective and efficient to detect unknown attacks, but it may produce high false 
positive rates. 
c. Specification-based detection: It defines a set of constraints that describe the 
correct operations of a program or protocol. Then, it checks the execution of 
programs and compares them to predefined constraints. It has ability to detect 
unknown attacks and produces low false positive rates. More details about 
classification and taxonomy of IDSs can be found in [6] [24][20]. 
1.3.2. Packet Dropping Attacks in MANETs 
As discussed, security of MANETs has become one of the primary concerns. For 
example, most of the routing protocols proposed for MANETs assume that every node in 
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the network is cooperative and not malicious [25][26]. Thus, a compromised node may 
cause the failure of the entire network. In addition, this assumption enables misbehaving 
nodes or malicious attackers to compromise the whole network by inserting malicious or 
non-cooperative nodes to MANETs. Therefore, a node is assumed to be helpful to other 
nodes to forward packets toward the correct destination. However, if a node does not 
forward packets for other nodes but drops them, it is called a packet dropping attack. The 
packet dropping attack is defined as a misbehaving node participates at routing 
information exchange and drops all data packet pass through it. In MANETs, the reasons 
for packet dropping can be intentionally or unintentionally as shown in Figure 1-4. The 
unintentionally packet dropping [27][28] can be happen as results of 1) node overload 
due to CPU overloaded or buffer overflow;  2) network congestion due to network 
applications; and 3) link error, such as interference or fading due to unreliability in 
wireless channels. However, as mentioned, intentionally packet dropping in a MANETs 
called packet dropping attack and nodes that drop packets intentionally named 
misbehaving nodes [27][28]. We can classify these nodes into selfish nodes and 
malicious nodes. For the first type, selfish nodes, node participates to carry out routing 
control packets (discovery and maintenance) inside a network to extract information from 
them, and drops data packets to save its energy since in MANETs the most energy 
consume as result of transmission as well as it drops data packet to save its bandwidth to 
send and receive only its own packets. However, in the second type of intentionally 
packet dropping, malicious nodes, node also participates to carry out routing control 
packets and drops all data packets to disrupt the network and effect availability and 
connectivity of the network. In addition, the malicious nodes are divided into two types, 
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named, black hole attacks and gray-hole attacks [29]. In black hole attacks, the malicious 
node drops all data packets that pass through it without dropping routing control packets. 
On the other hand, in gray hole attacks, the malicious node is smart enough to drop some 
of data packet that pass through it by adjusting its packets dropping ratio to IDS’s 
detection threshold. Thus, it is difficult to the IDS to detect the gray-hole attack unlike 
black hole attack. However, the black hole attacks have affected the network’s 
performance more than the gray-hole attacks as the first one drop all data packet pass 
through. As a result, it disrupts the availability and connectivity of the network, which are 
considered serious metrics for network's performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  1-4: Packets Dropping in MANETs 
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1.4. Research Overview 
This section includes research background as well as research challenges. Finally, it 
includes summary of our research contributions. 
1.4.1. Research Background 
As discussed before, most of the proposed MANETs protocols assume that all 
nodes in the network are cooperative, and do not address security issues in MANETs. In 
additions, the open medium, rapidly changing topology and decentralized of nodes in 
MANETs, make them vulnerable for all types of passive and active attacks. On the other 
hand, the encryption and authentication mechanisms, which are considered as the first 
line of defense, are no longer sufficient to protect MANETs. Thus, IDSs are needed as a 
second line of defense to protect the network from such security threats. However, the 
traditional wired IDSs that were designed for wired network cannot be used in MANETs 
since MANETs have different features and architecture than traditional wired networks. 
As a result, there are many recent IDSs designed especially for MANETs and most of 
them based on the Watchdog mechanism that was proposed in 2000 by Sergio Marti et al. 
[30].  
In Watchdog, each node monitors its neighbors using overhearing promiscuous 
mode to be sure that they forward received packets or not. Even though, Watchdog 
mechanism improves the throughput in MANETs with the existence of selfish or 
malicious nodes. It has six weaknesses include: 1) ambiguous collisions; 2) receiver 
collisions; 3) limited transmission power; 4) false misbehavior report; 5) collaborative 
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(collusion) of malicious nodes, and 6) partial dropping. However, there are many 
researches are proposed to solve these weaknesses including TWOACK, AACK and 
EAACK schemes. The TWOACK scheme was proposed in 2005 by Balakrishnan et al. 
[31]. It is acknowledgement base scheme that solves two weaknesses of Watchdog, 
named, limited transmission power and receiver collision. However, it solves these two 
weaknesses with more routing overhead and calculations that effect network’s 
performance as well as it still suffers from collaborative attacks. On the other hand, the 
AACK scheme was proposed in 2009 by Al-Roubaiey and Sheltami [29] [32] as 
enhancement to TWOACK scheme. Like TWOACK scheme, AACK is acknowledgment 
base scheme that solves the same two weaknesses of Watchdog, named, limited 
transmission power and receiver collision but with less routing overhead and calculations. 
However, it still suffers from false misbehavior report and collaborative attacks. 
However, Nan et al. [33] proposed EAACK scheme in 2010 as enhancement to AACK. It 
solves the three significant weaknesses of Watchdog, named, limited transmission power, 
receiver collision and false misbehaving report. However, it still suffers from 
collaborative attacks. More details about these schemes were explained in next section 
(related work). 
According to failure of mentioned existing IDSs to work within presence of 
consecutive collaborative attacks, in this research, we proposed a new technique that 
overcomes the three significant weaknesses of Watchdog, named, limited transmission 
power, receiver collision and collaborative attacks with the presence of consecutive 
malicious nodes in a rout path. 
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1.4.2. Research Challenges 
It is challenging to design a new instruction detection system (IDS) for MANETs. 
Due to the infrastructure-less and lack of administration point in MANET, it makes the 
collection of data in the whole network difficult. In addition, MANETs have limited 
resources, such as limited wireless bandwidth, computation ability and energy supply that 
we need to be considered when designing a new IDS framework for MANETs. 
Moreover, the distinction between false alarms and true alarms as a result of mobility are 
very difficult. For instance, a node can send wrong routing information due to free 
movement randomly or due to being compromised. Finally, it is challenging tradeoffs to 
increase network performance and reduce routing over head in MANETs.  
1.4.3. Research Contributions 
The contributions of this research include: 
 Obtain general understanding of the security protocols in MANETs. 
 Due to the failure of mentioned existing IDSs to work within presence of 
collaborative attacks, we proposed a new IDS that overcomes the three significant 
weaknesses of Watchdog, named, limited transmission power, receiver collision and 
collaborative attacks with the presence of collaborative attacks especially under the 
presence of two consecutive malicious nodes in a rout path. 
 Implement the proposed IDS using NS-2 simulator and test it in low speed and high 
speed networks under various scenarios as well as compare the results with existing 
IDSs, such as AACK technique. 
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1.5. Research Organization  
Chapter 1 of this thesis gives an overview of mobile ad hoc networks, mobile ad 
hoc routing protocols, intrusion detection systems, research challenges and research 
contributions as well. The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 shows 
related work and problem statement. Chapter 3 describes system models and 
implementation of the new proposed A3ACKs intrusion detection system. Chapter 4 
discusses research methodology, simulation configuration and the metrics used to 
evaluate network performance. Details about simulation results are presented in chapter 4 
as well. Lastly, conclusions and future work are described also in this chapter. 
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2 CHAPTER 2 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter describes the problem statement, existing literature on malicious node 
detection mechanisms and describes limitations of existing IDSs as well. 
2.1. Problem Statement 
This research is based on Watchdog technique, so we start by describing Watchdog 
technique as well as its weaknesses in details, and then we identify our research problem 
statement in context of literature review of watchdog scheme. 
2.1.1. Watchdog Technique 
Watchdog technique was proposed by Sergio Marti et al. [30] and it represents the 
base intrusion detection technique that many of the recent researches depended on. They 
proposed two techniques (Watchdog and Pathrater) that improve the throughput in 
MANETs with the existence of selfish or malicious nodes that agree to forward packets 
but fail to do so. In ad-hoc network, a node is considered as misbehaving for overloaded, 
selfish, malicious, or broken. An overloaded node lacks the CPU cycles, buffer space, or 
available network bandwidth to forward packets. On the other hand, a selfish node is 
unwilling to spend battery life, CPU cycles, or available network bandwidth to forward 
packets not of direct interest to it, even though it expects others to forward packets on its 
behalf. A malicious node may launch a DoS (Denial of Service) attack by dropping 
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packets. A broken node might have a software fault that prevents it from forwarding 
packets.  
The two mentioned techniques (Watchdog and Pathrater) were used to mitigate 
the decrease in the throughput in MANETs due to the above node characteristics. The 
Watchdog technique serves as an intrusion detection system that detects the presence of 
misbehaving nodes in the network, while Pathrater technique is proposed to respond to 
these misbehaving nodes by helping the routing protocol to avoid these nodes. When a 
node forwards a packet, the node’s Watchdog verifies that the next node in the path also 
forwards the packet by listening promiscuously to the next node’s transmissions. If the 
next node does not forward the packet, it is considered misbehaving. Watchdog has 
misbehavior’s counter, every time a node fails to forward the packet, the Watchdog 
increases the failures counter. If the counter exceeds a predefined threshold, it concludes 
that the node is misbehaving. As a result, this node is avoided in future transmission by 
choosing a new path from source to destination based on a simple route rating algorithm. 
The Pathrater run by each node in the network to combine knowledge of misbehaving 
nodes with link reliability data to pick the route most likely to be reliable. It uses the 
reliability metric instead of shortest path. Furthermore, each node maintains a rating for 
every other node it knows about in the network. It calculates a path metric by averaging 
the node ratings in the path. The Watchdog technique has its own advantages and 
drawbacks. The significant advantage of Watchdog is to detect misbehaving nodes 
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instead of just links. On the other hand, Watchdog has six disadvantages that may fail to 
detect a misbehaving node in the presence of: 
1
 
a) Ambiguous collisions: the collection prevents node A from overhearing the 
transmission of packet 1 from node B to C due to another packet, packet 2, sent from 
node S to A as shown in Figure 2-1.  
 
 
 
Figure  2-1: Ambiguous Collisions 
 
b) Receiver collisions: Node A assure that node B has forwarded packet 1 to C, but fails 
to detect that node C didn’t receive packet 1 due to collision with packet 2 from node 
X as shown in Figure 2-2.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2-2: Receiver Collisions 
 
c) Limited transmission power: in order conserve energy, a misbehaving node could 
limit its transmission power such that the signal is strong enough to be overheard by 
the previous node, but too weak to be received by the true recipient, such as node B 
                                                 
1All dotted arrow lines in the figures indicate the transmission over the rest of the route. However, all solid arrow lines 
indicate the transmission that is actually involved in our discussion. 
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limits it transmission power, so it is strong enough to be overheard by node A but too 
weak to be received by node C as shown in Figure 2-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2-3: Limited Transmission Power 
 
d) False misbehavior: This occurs when a node falsely reports other nodes as 
misbehaving. For example, node A reports node B as misbehaving node while node B 
successfully forwarded packet 1 to node C as shown in Figure 2-4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2-4: False Misbehavior Report 
 
e) Collaborative attack (collusion attack): Multiple misbehaving nodes in ad-hoc 
network cooperate to perform sophisticated attack. For example, nodes B and C in 
Figure 2-5 could collude to cause mischief, where node B forwards a packet to node 
C but does not report to node A when C drops the packet. Because of this limitation, 
it may be necessary to disallow two or more consecutive untrusted nodes in a routing 
path. 
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Figure  2-5: Cooperative attack 
 
f) Partial dropping: a node can circumvent the Watchdog by dropping packets at a lower 
rate than the Watchdog’s configured minimum misbehaving threshold, and this is call 
Gray Hole Attack. 
2.1.2. Research Problem Statement    
As discussed early Watchdog Technique has six weaknesses and some solutions 
are proposed for limited transmission power and receiver collision problems. To the best 
of our knowledge, none of the existing IDS protocols works with the presence of 
consecutive collaborative attacks, in this research, we proposed a novel IDS protocol that 
overcomes three significant weaknesses of Watchdog, mainly, limited transmission 
power, receiver collision and collaborative attacks with or without the presence of 
collaborative attacks especially if there are two consecutive malicious nodes in the route. 
2.2. Related Work 
Many researches have been proposed to improve the security of MANETs against 
misbehaving nodes. Watchdog technique, as mentioned early, is considered the basis for 
many proposed instruction detection system in MANETs. It is proposed by Marti et al. 
[30] and built based on Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol. It mainly consists of   
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two parts, called, Watchdog and Pathrater that improve throughput in MANETs in 
presence of misbehavior nodes that agree to forward packets but fail to do so. The 
Watchdog technique serves as an intrusion detection system that detects the presence of 
misbehaving nodes in the network, while Pathrater technique is proposed to respond to 
these misbehaving nodes by helping the routing protocol to avoid these nodes. In 
addition, many researches have provided that the Watchdog technique is efficient and 
capable of detecting misbehavior or malicious nodes at forward level instead of links 
level. As a result, Watchdog scheme is considered the basis for many proposed 
instruction detection systems in MANETs. However, Watchdog scheme might not detect 
malicious nodes with the presence of: 1) ambiguous collisions; 2) receiver collisions; 3) 
limited transmission power; 4) false misbehavior report; 5) collusion (collaborative) of 
malicious nodes, and 6) partial dropping as discussed in the previous section. 
  An enhancement scheme to Watchdog technique was proposed by Parker et al 
[34]. Unlike Watchdog, which is applicable just for DSR protocol, they proposed 
enhancement that can be applied to all routing protocols in MANETs. In contrary to the 
Watchdog, in this technique, every node in the MANET is able to overhear all the other 
nodes in its proximity and not just the node that is flow it up on the routing path. This 
mechanism can be considered as combination of two response modes, named, passive 
response mode and active response mode. In the first mode, passive response mode, 
every node works independently and finally the intrusive node blocks from using all 
network resources. On the other hand, in active response mode, the decision is done by 
cluster header by initiating a voting procedure to determine a node inside the networks as 
an intrusive node. If the majority of the nodes determine that the suspected node is fact 
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intrusive, an alert will be broadcast along the network as well as the intrusive node blocks 
from using all network resources. 
An extended scheme to the Watchdog was proposed by Nasser at el. [35] called 
ExWatchdog. They proposed extended intrusion detection system for discovering 
malicious nodes in MANETs. They proposed a solution to the false misbehaving problem 
of Watchdog technique, where the real intruder or the malicious node falsely reports 
other nodes as misbehaving. In this technique, ExWatchdog, each node has a table; this 
table records the number of packets the node sends, forwards or receives respectively. 
When the source node receives a report about misbehaving node, the source node will 
find another path to destination node asking about the number of packets that it received. 
If the number of packets are equal to the number of the packets that the source node has 
sent, the real malicious node is the node that reported others nodes as misbehaving. 
Otherwise, the report is valid and the reported nodes are malicious nodes. However, the 
ExWatchdog still suffers from the availability of the misbehaving node in all available 
routes from source to destination. 
All the previous solutions based on Watchdog mechanism. However, TWOACK 
was proposed by Balakrishnan et al. [31] replaces Watchdog and solves two of its 
problems, namely, receiver collision and limited transmission power. It is neither 
Watchdog- based scheme nor an enhancement to Watchdog technique.  The TWOACK 
scheme detects misbehaving links by acknowledging every data packet transmitted from 
source to destination over ever three consecutive nodes along the path. It works on 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol and achieved by special acknowledging packet 
called TWOACK. In TWOACK, the third node along the route from every three 
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consecutive nodes is required to send back an acknowledgement packet to the node that is 
two hops away from it down the route. For example, as in Figure 2-6, when node B 
receives packet 1 from A and forwards to C, node C (two hops away form A) is required 
to generate acknowledgement packet (TWOACK), which has reverse route from A to C,  
and send the TWOACK packet back to A indicating B has forwarded the packet 1 to C 
successfully. If A didn’t get TWOACK packet from C within predefined time period, 
node A reports node B to be malicious node. The same process is carried out by every 
three consecutive nodes along the rest of route. Even though Watchdog scheme solved 
the limited transmission power and receiver collision, is still suffer from adds more 
overhead to the routing protocol because of the multiple acknowledgements for every 
packet along the route from source to destination, especially on a long path. Furthermore, 
TWOACK scheme detect misbehaving links instead of nodes and this gives the malicious 
node more chance to drop more packets on different links in same network. 
  
 
 
Figure  2-6: TWOACK scheme 
 
A recent related work is done by Al-Roubaiey and Sheltami [29] [32]. In this work, they 
proposed an enhancement instruction detection system called AACK (Adaptive 
Acknowledgment) for solving two significant problem of Watchdog, namely, limited 
transmission power and receiver collision. Unlike TWOACK, AACK scheme reduced 
network overhead while still maintaining network throughput. Similar to TWOACK, 
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AACK scheme is an acknowledgment-based network layer scheme. AACK can be 
considered as combination of two modes controlled by switching system. The first mode 
called TACK mode where it works exactly similar to TWOACK scheme, as in Figure 2-
6, except that it detects malicious nodes instead of links. In the TACK mode, every node 
needs to send back an acknowledgement packet to the node that is two hops away from it.  
The second mode called ACKnowledge (ACK) mode, which is end-to-end 
acknowledgement. In ACK mode, the destination node is required to send back 
acknowledgement packet to the source node as shown in Figure 2-7. 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2-7: AACK scheme 
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overhead except one bit of flag reserved in DSR header indicates the type of packet 1. 
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as shown in Figure 2-7. If the source node receives the ACK packet, then packet 1 has 
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mode, by sending TACK packet to the destination D. The TACK mode works similar to 
TWOACK scheme to detect malicious nodes along the whole path. 
The AACK scheme uses hybrid modes, ACK and TACK, to reduce the network 
overhead. However, AACK still suffer from detect malicious nodes when there is a false 
misbehavior report or forged acknowledgement packet. 
As enhancement to the AACK scheme, Nan et al. [33] proposed a new scheme 
called EAACK (Enhanced Adaptive ACKnowledgement) for solving four significant 
problems of Watchdog mechanism, namely, ambiguous collisions, receiver collisions, 
limited transmission power and false misbehavior. The EAACK scheme can be 
considered as combination of three modes, namely, ACK mode, S-ACK mode (Secure- 
ACKnowledge), and MRA mode (Misbehavior Report Authenticate) controlled by switch 
system. The EAACK scheme starts with the first mode, ACK mode, to send a packet 
from source to destination without any overhead except two bits header of DSR indicate 
the type of the packet. 
The first mode, ACK mode, is end-to-end acknowledgement scheme works 
exactly identical to ACK mode in AACK mechanism, discussed above in Figure 2-7, 
where the source node sends out the data packet to destination node after registering its 
ID and sending time. When the destination node received the data packet successfully, it 
is required to send back ACK packet to the source node. If the source node received the 
ACK packet, the packet has been sent to the destination and the transmission completed 
successfully. Otherwise, the source node switches to the second mode. 
 The second mode, S-ACK mode, is 2ACK scheme works exactly similar to 
TWOACK [31] scheme, as in Figure 2-6, except that it detects malicious nodes instead of 
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links. In the S-ACK mode, every three consecutive nodes, the third node is required to 
send back an S-ACK acknowledgement packet to the first node to confirm it has received 
the packet. However, unlike TWOACK scheme, in S-ACK mode, when a misbehavior 
report is received, instead of trusting the report and mark the node as misbehaving, the 
misbehaving report forwards to the source node. Then, the source node switches to MRA 
mode by sending out a MRA packet to the destination node via a different path. If there is 
no new path exists in the path, the source node creates a new DSR route request to find a 
new path.  
The MRA mode is the third mode of EAACK scheme that is used by destination 
node to check its local memory looking for a requested packet ID. If it exists, the sending 
packet has been received successfully by the destination node and the node that is 
reported the false misbehavior report is a malicious node as shown in Figure 2-8. 
Otherwise, the misbehavior report is valid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2-8: MRA scheme 
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Another enhancement scheme proposed also by Nan et al. [36] called EAACK2. 
They extended EAACK [33] mechanism by applying Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) 
to detect forged acknowledgment (acknowledgment authenticate) by preventing attackers 
from forging fake acknowledgment and thus conceive its malicious misbehavior. The 
EAACK2 can be considered also as combination of three modes, namely, ACK mode 
(ACKnowledge), S-ACK mode (Secure- ACKnowledge), and MRA mode (Misbehavior 
Report Authenticate) controlled by switch system. The EAACK2 scheme starts with the 
first mode, ACK mode, to send a packet from source to destination without any overhead 
except two bits header of DSR indicate the type of the packet. 
The first mode, ACK mode, is end-to-end acknowledgement scheme works 
exactly identical to ACK mode in AACK [29][32] mechanism, as discussed above in 
Figure 2-7, where the source node sends out the data packet to destination node after 
registering its ID and sending time. When the destination node received the data packet 
successfully, it is required to send back an ACK packet to the source node. If the source 
node received the ACK packet successfully, the packet has been sent to the destination 
and the transmission completed successfully. Otherwise, the source node switches to S-
ACK mode by sending an S-ACK packet to the destination node along the same path.  
The S-ACK mode works similar to the TWOACK [31] scheme, as in Figure 2-6, 
except that it detects malicious nodes instead of links. In the S-ACK mode, every three 
consecutive nodes, the third node is required to send back an S-ACK acknowledgement 
packet to the first node to confirm it has received the packet. However, unlike EAACK 
[33] scheme, in the EAACK2, the third node needs to sign the S-ACK acknowledgment 
packet with its own digital signature to prevent the second node from forging the S-ACK 
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acknowledgment packet without forwarding the packet to the third node. In addition, to 
avoid creating black-hole in the network by a malicious node without detecting, when the 
first node received the S-ACK packet from the third node, it has to verify the third node’s 
signature using predefined public key. However, if the first node didn’t receive this S-
ACK packet with the predefined time, the first node reports both the second and the third 
nodes as malicious node by sending a misbehavior report packet to the source node. 
However, when the source node receives the misbehavior report packet, it switches to 
MRA mode instead of trust the misbehavior report immediately and mark the nodes as 
misbehavior nodes.  
In the MRA mode, the source node sends MRA packet to the destination node via 
different route. If there is no new path exists in the path, the source node creates a new 
DSR route request to find a new path. When the destination node receives the MRA 
packet, the MRA packet has data packet ID, it checks its local memory to find out if the 
request packet’s ID exists or not. If it exists, the sending packet has been received 
successfully and the node that is reported the false misbehavior report marks as a 
malicious node as shown in Figure 2-8 above. Otherwise, the misbehavior report is valid 
and confirmed. Even though, EAACK2 mechanism is able to solve the problem of forge 
acknowledgment packets. It suffer from detects malicious nodes with the presence of 
collaborative attacks. 
Shakshuki et al. [37] proposed another enhancement mechanism for AACK 
scheme named EAACK. They extended AACK [29][32] mechanism by applying Digital 
Signature Authenticate using DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) and RSA (Rivest, 
Shamir and Adleman) algorithms to detect forged acknowledgment by preventing 
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attackers from forging fake acknowledgment as well as  they implemented both DSA and 
RSA algorithms to find the most optimal solution that can be used in MANETs. Like 
EAACK2 [34] scheme, the EAACK can be considered as combination of three modes, 
namely, ACK mode (ACKnowledge), S-ACK mode (Secure- ACKnowledge), and MRA 
mode (Misbehavior Report Authenticate) controlled by switch system. The EAACK 
scheme starts with the first mode, ACK mode, to send a packet from source to destination 
without any overhead except two bits header of DSR indicate the type of the packet. 
The first mode, ACK mode, is end-to-end acknowledgement scheme works 
exactly similar to ACK mode in AACK [29][32] mechanism, as discussed above in 
Figure 2-7, where the source node sends out the data packet to destination node after 
registering its ID and sending time. When the destination node received the data packet 
successfully, it is required to send back an ACK packet to the source node. If the source 
node received the ACK packet successfully, the packet has been sent to the destination 
and the transmission completed successfully. Otherwise, the source node switches to S-
ACK mode by sending an S-ACK packet to the destination node along the same path.  
The S-ACK mode works identical to the TWOACK [31] scheme, as in Figure2- 6, 
except that it detects malicious nodes instead of links. In the S-ACK mode, every three 
consecutive nodes, the third node is required to send back an S-ACK acknowledgement 
packet to the first node to confirm it has received the packet. However, in the EAACK, 
the third node needs to sign the S-ACK acknowledgment packet with its own digital 
signature to prevent the second node from forging the S-ACK acknowledgment packet 
without forwarding the packet to the third node. In addition, to avoid creating black-hole 
in the network by a malicious node without detecting, when the first node received the S-
31 
 
ACK packet from the third node, it has to verify the third node’s signature using 
predefined public key. However, if the first node didn’t receive this S-ACK packet with 
the predefined time, the first node reports both the second and the third nodes as 
malicious node by sending a misbehavior report packet to the source node. However, 
when the source node receives the misbehavior report packet, it switches to MRA mode 
instead of trust the misbehavior report immediately and mark the nodes as misbehavior 
nodes.  
In the MRA mode, the source node sends MRA packet to the destination node via 
different route. If there is no new path exists in the path, the source node creates a new 
DSR route request to find a new path. When the destination node receives the MRA 
packet, the MRA packet has data packet ID, it checks its local memory to find out if the 
request packet’s ID exists or not. If it exists, the sending packet has been received 
successfully and the node that is reported the false misbehavior report marks as a 
malicious node shown in Figure 2-8 above. Otherwise, the misbehavior report is valid 
and confirmed.  
Regarding the DSA (Digital Signature Authenticate), EAACK is an 
acknowledgement –based intrusion detection system that means all the three modes, 
namely, ACK, S-ACK, and MRA are acknowledgement-based detection schemes. 
Therefore, they all depend on acknowledgement packets to detect malicious nodes in the 
network. Thus, it is too important to be sure all the packets in the EAACK are authentic 
and unpolluted. At the end, the authors concluded that the DSA (Digital Signature 
Algorithms) algorithm is the most optimal solution to be applied in MANETs to solve the 
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problem of forge acknowledgment packets. However, EAACK scheme still suffers from 
detects malicious nodes with the presence of collaborative attacks. 
2.3. Limitations of existing IDSs for MANETs 
There are many researches proposed, as explained early, to mitigate and solve the 
problem of packet dropping attacks in MANETs. According to the previous literature 
review, most of these proposed researches depend on Watchdog scheme. Some of these 
researches have improved the detection efficiency without solving the weaknesses of 
Watchdog. On the other hand, some of these researches have enhanced Watchdog scheme 
to work under different types of MANETs routing protocol rather than DSR protocol. In 
addition, some of them have extended Watchdog scheme to overcome the false 
misbehaving problem of Watchdog technique, such as ExWatchdo scheme. However, 
some of these researches are considered replacement to Watchdog scheme by solving 
Watchdog’s drawbacks as well as they are considered acknowledgement base 
mechanisms. These mechanisms include TWOACK and AACK, EAACK schemes.  
The TWOACK scheme was proposed in 2005 by Balakrishnan et al. [31]. It is 
acknowledgement base scheme that solves two weaknesses of Watchdog, named, limited 
transmission power and receiver collision. However, it solves these two weaknesses with 
more routing overhead and calculations that effect network’s performance. In addition, it 
inefficient since it detects misbehaving links instead of nodes in which it gives more 
chance to the malicious node to drop more packets in each link it appears. Lastly, it still 
suffers from collaborative attacks.  
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On the other hand, the AACK scheme was proposed in 2009 by Al-Roubaiey and 
Sheltami [29] [32] as enhancement to TWOACK scheme. Like TWOACK scheme, 
AACK is acknowledgment base scheme that solves the same two weaknesses of 
Watchdog, named limited transmission power and receiver collision but with less routing 
overhead and calculations since it uses hybrid schemes. However, it still suffers from 
false misbehavior report and collaborative attacks. However, Nan et al. [33] proposed 
EAACK scheme in 2010 as enhancement to AACK. It solves the three significant 
weaknesses of Watchdog, named, limited transmission power, receiver collision and false 
misbehaving report. But, it still suffers from collaborative attacks. More details about 
these schemes were explained in previous section (related work). 
Due to failure of mentioned existing IDSs to work within presence of consecutive 
collaborative attacks, in this research, we proposed a new technique that overcomes the 
three significant weaknesses of Watchdog, named, limited transmission power, receiver 
collision and collaborative attacks with the presence of consecutive malicious nodes in a 
rout path. It also improved the detection accuracy by doing nodes detection instead of 
links detection.  
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3 CHAPTER 3 
SYSTEM MODELS AND DESIGN 
3.1. Overview  
In MANETs, as discussed, misbehaving nodes that participate at routing 
information exchange and drop data packets pass through called packet dropping attacks. 
Therefore, misbehaving nodes degrade MANETs’s performance sharply by dropping data 
packets that pass through. These misbehaving nodes, as explained, classify into selfish 
nodes and malicious nodes. The selfish nodes participate to carry out routing control 
packets and drop data packets to save its energy and bandwidth. The malicious nodes also 
participate to carry out routing control packets and drop all data packets to disrupt the 
availability and connectivity of the network. In addition, the malicious nodes are divided 
into two types, named, black-hole attacks and gray-hole attacks [29]. The black hole 
attacks drop all data packets that pass through. On the other hand, the gray-hole attacks 
are smart enough to drop some of data packet that pass through by adjusting its packets 
dropping rate to IDS’s detection threshold. Therefore, it is difficult to the IDS to detect 
the gray-hole attack unlike black-hole attack. However, the black-hole attacks have 
affected the network’s performance more than the gray-hole attacks as the first one drop 
all data packet pass through. As a result, it disrupts the availability and connectivity of 
the network, which are considered serious metrics for network's performance. 
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There are many solutions are proposed to mitigate the problem of packets 
dropping in MANETs. Watchdog mechanism was the early technique to mitigate the 
problem of packets dropping in MANETs and it was proposed in 2000 by Marti et al. 
[30]. However, Watchdog scheme, as discussed, has six weaknesses include: 1) 
ambiguous collisions; 2) receiver collisions; 3) limited transmission power; 4) false 
misbehavior report; 5) collusion (collaborative) of malicious nodes, and 6) partial 
dropping. On the other hand, there are several solutions proposed based on Watchdog 
scheme to overcome its drawbacks. Some of these researches, according to literature 
review, have improved the detection efficiency without solving the weaknesses of 
Watchdog. In addition, some of them have enhanced Watchdog scheme to work under 
different types of MANETs routing protocol rather than DSR protocol. Moreover, some 
of them have extended Watchdog scheme to overcome the false misbehaving problem of 
Watchdog technique, such as ExWatchdo scheme by Nasser at el.[35]. Lastly, some of 
these researches are considered as replacement to Watchdog scheme because they are 
solving Watchdog’s weaknesses as well as they are considering acknowledgement base 
mechanisms. These mechanisms include TWOACK and AACK, EAACK schemes. The 
TWOACK scheme was proposed in 2005 by Balakrishnan et al. [31]. It is 
acknowledgement base scheme that solves two weaknesses of Watchdog, named, limited 
transmission power and receiver collision by verifying packets delivery over every three 
consecutive node over a path between a source and a destination. However, it solves 
these two weaknesses with more routing overhead and calculations that effect network’s 
performance. In addition, it inefficient since it detects misbehaving links instead of nodes 
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in which it gives more chance to the malicious node to drop more packets in each link it 
appears. As a result, it still suffers from collaborative attacks.  
On the other hand, the AACK scheme was proposed in 2009 by Al-Roubaiey and 
Sheltami [29] [32] as enhancement to TWOACK scheme. It is also acknowledgment base 
scheme that solves the same two weaknesses of Watchdog, named limited transmission 
power and receiver collision but with less routing overhead and calculations since it uses 
hybrid schemes. But, it still suffers from false misbehavior report and collaborative 
attacks. However, Nan et al. [33] proposed EAACK scheme in 2010 as enhancement to 
AACK. Even though the EAACK scheme solves the three significant weaknesses of 
Watchdog, named, limited transmission power, receiver collision and false misbehaving 
report, it still suffers from collaborative attacks.  
Due to failure of mentioned existing IDSs to work within presence of consecutive 
collaborative attacks, in this research, we proposed a new technique that overcomes the 
three significant weaknesses of Watchdog, named, limited transmission power, receiver 
collision and collaborative attacks with the presence of consecutive malicious nodes in a 
rout path. It also improved the detection accuracy by doing nodes detection instead of 
links detection.  
3.2. Problem Definition 
Our proposed approach A3ACKs, pronounced as Adaptive Three 
ACKnowledgements, is extended to AACK scheme, but it is designed to solve its 
drawbacks by talking three significant weaknesses of Watchdog scheme, named, limited 
transmission power, receiver collision and collaborative attacks (collusion attack) 
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especially when there are two consecutive collaborative malicious nodes in a route path. 
In this section, we discuss these three weaknesses in details. 
a) Receiver collisions: Node A assure that node B has forwarded packet 1 to C, but fails 
to detect that node C didn’t receive packet 1 due to collision with packet 2 from node 
X as shown in Figure 3-1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure  3-1 : Receiver Collisions problem. 
 
In this case, node B is smart attack who can cheat the monitor node A and intend to do a 
collision at the next hop node C by sending the packet 1 while the received node C busy 
with other transmissions from node X.  
b) Limited transmission power: In order conserve energy, a misbehaving node could 
limit its transmission power such that the signal is strong enough to be overheard by 
the previous node, but too weak to be received by the true recipient, such as node B 
limits its transmission power, so it is strong enough to be overheard by node A but 
too weak to be received by node C as shown in Figure 3-2. 
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Figure  3-2: Limited Transmission Power problem. 
 
In this case, node B is smart attack that can control its transmission power to let the 
monitor, node A, overhears its transmission while the next hop node C is out of its range. 
c) Collaborative attacks (collusion attacks): Multiple misbehaving nodes in ad-hoc networks 
cooperate to perform sophisticated attack. In another word, if there are two consecutive 
collaborative misbehaving nodes in a route path, they are cooperative to drop any data 
packet. For example, nodes B and C in Figure 3-3 could collude to cause mischief, where 
node B forwards packet 1 to node C but does not report to node A when node C drops the 
packet 1, that means node B cooperates with node C to drop packet 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  3-3: Collaborative attacks. 
 
We conclude that the TWOACK and AACK schemes fail to detect two consecutive 
collaborative misbehaving nodes in a route path because both of them based on send back 
2ACK packet to a sender of a data packet two hops away in opposite direction to verify 
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packets delivery over every three consecutive node over a path between a source and a 
destination. However, as in Figure 3-3, two consecutive misbehaving nodes are able to 
send back 2ACK packet to a sender of a data packet two hops away in opposite direction 
and drop the data packet as well. In this case the TWOACK and AACK existing schemes 
are vulnerable to the consecutive collaborative attacks problem. 
In this research, we propose a novel IDS technique that is designed mainly for 
MANETs, which solves all of receiver collision, limited transmission power and 
collaborative attacks within presence of two consecutive collaborative misbehaving 
nodes in a route path. It also improved the detection accuracy by doing malicious nodes 
detection instead of links detection. 
3.3. Model Assumptions 
The assumptions in this research include: 
 Our proposed technique works on any source routing protocol, such as DSR protocol. 
 Source and destination cannot be misbehaving nodes. 
 We assume each pair of nodes use bi-direction communication. 
 We assume that the misbehaving nodes are working as collaborative attacks to drop 
any data packets if there are two consecutive misbehaving nodes in a route path. Also, 
we assume that the misbehaving nodes are working as non-collaborative attacks to 
drop any data packets if they are not consecutive in a route path. 
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 We assume that the misbehaving nodes are participating to forward control or 
information packets as well as they are participating in the routing discovery and 
maintenance. 
 We assume that the misbehaving nodes are controlling their transmission power to 
produce limited transmission problem. 
 Finally, we assume that the misbehaving nodes are trying to generate receiver 
collision at a receiving node by sending packets while the received node busy with 
other transmissions. 
3.4. A3ACKs Scheme Model 
In this section, we describe our new proposed scheme models, node models and 
switching system models as well. 
3.4.1. A3ACKs Scheme Description 
In this subsection, we describe our proposed scheme in details. As explained in 
section 3.2, A3ACKs is abbreviation of Adaptive Three ACKnowledgements. It is an 
extension to AACK scheme, it is designed to complement AACK by solving three 
weaknesses of Watchdog scheme, namely: limited transmission power, receiver collision 
and collaborative attacks (collusion attack) especially when there are two consecutive 
collaborative malicious nodes in a route path. The A3ACKs scheme is a network layer 
acknowledgement based scheme, which is considered as combination system consists of 
three major models: End-To-End Acknowledgement (Aack) model, Two 
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Acknowledgement (Tack) model and Three Acknowledgment (Thack) model. It is built 
on DSR protocol due to it needs a source route protocol. Details about these models as 
follow: 
3.4.1.1. Aack Model 
As discussed previously, Aack model is basically End-To-End Acknowledgement 
model. It works as a part of the hybrid scheme in A3ACKs technique. It is the default 
model of A3ACKs mechanism and aims to reduce the routing overhead of networks when 
there is no misbehaving node detected in an active route path. Figure 3-4 shows the Aack 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  3-4: Aack Model Procedure of A3ACKs Scheme 
 
In Aack model, a sender node S starts sending out an Aack data packet to a destination 
node D and stores the ID and sending time of the sending Aack data packet. In this model 
all intermediate nodes along the active route should cooperative to relay the Aack data 
packet to the destination node D by only forwarding it to next hop without saving the ID 
or sending time of the sending data packet. If the destination node D successfully 
received the Aack data packet from the source node S, the destination node is required to 
send back acknowledgement packet (Aack) to the source node S within predefined 
timeout over the same route but in a reverse order. Otherwise, the sender node S has to 
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switch to Tack mode by sending out Tack data packet to destination node D to detect if 
there is a misbehaving node in the active route path. 
3.4.1.2. Tack Model 
The Tack model is enhanced version of TWOACK technique proposed by Liu et 
al. [11] except that the Tack model in A3ACKs scheme is able to perform nodes detection 
instead of links detection. The principle of Tack model is to make every three consecutive 
nodes work together in a group to detect misbehaving nodes in a route path. That means, 
for every three consecutive nodes in a route path the third node, which is two hops away 
from the first one, is required to send back acknowledgement packet (Tack) to the firs 
node in that group within predefined timeout. For example, as in Figure 3-5, when node 
B receives packet 1 from A and forwards to C, node C (two hops away form A) is 
required to generate an acknowledgement packet (Tack), which has reverse route from A 
to C,  and sends the Tack packet back to A indicating B has forwarded the packet 1 to C 
successfully. If A didn’t get Tack packet from C within predefined time period, node A 
reports node B as malicious node. The same process is carried out by every three 
consecutive nodes along rest of the route path.  
 
 
 
 
Figure  3-5: Tack Model Procedure of A3ACKs Scheme 
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As a result, the Tack mode, in A3ACKs technique, aims to detect misbehaving nodes with 
the presence of receiver collision and limited transmission power. However, if the source 
node S still does receive neither acknowledgement packet (Tack) nor alarm with a 
predefined timeout, it has to switch to Thack model by sending out Thack data packet to 
detect if there are any two consecutive collaborative misbehaving nodes in the route path 
as explained in section 3.2.  
3.4.1.3. Thack Model 
The Thack model is not only used to solve the problems of receiver collision and 
limited transmission power but also to solve the problem of consecutive collaborative 
attacks within the presence of two consecutive collaborative misbehaving nodes in a 
route path. The principle of the Thack model is to make every four consecutive nodes 
work together in a group to detect if there are any two consecutive collaborative 
misbehaving nodes in a path. That means, for every four consecutive nodes in a path 
fourth node, which is three hops away from the first one, is required to send back 
acknowledgement packet (Thack) to the firs node in that group within predefined timeout 
as in shown in Figure 3-6.  
 
 
Figure  3-6: Thack Model Procedure of A3ACKs Scheme 
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has reverse route from A to X,   and sends it back to A indicating B and C have 
forwarded packet 1 to X successfully. If A didn’t get the Thack packet from X within 
predefined time period, node A reports nodes B and C as malicious nodes. The same 
process is carried out by every four consecutive nodes along rest of the route path.  
By adaption these three models, the new A3ACKs technique solves all of receiver 
collision, limited transmission power and also consecutive collaborative attacks problems 
within the presence of two consecutive collaborative misbehaving nodes in a route path 
as explained in section 3.2. 
3.4.2. Node Models 
In this subsection, we discussed two types of nodes that are used in our implementation 
of the A3ACKs mechanism, named, regular nodes and misbehaving nodes. 
3.4.2.1. Regular Node Model 
As discussed, we have implemented the A3ACKs mechanism over DSR protocol 
using NS2 simulator, and regular nodes have modified to work within A3ACKs 
mechanism in proper behavior. Regard NS2, the regular nodes are classified into three 
types based on node’s event or action: source node, forward node and destination node. 
In this research, we have modified the functionality of the regular nodes to work properly 
with the A3ACKs mechanism as follow: 
1. Source node, which represents the initiator source of sent packets. We have modified 
source nodes to work properly in the mentioned three models (Aack, Tack, and 
Thack) of the A3ACKs mechanism. The source nodes are responsible to switch 
between these three models based on switch system procedure as will be discussed in 
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next section. In addition, they are responsible to select a suitable route path to 
destination. Finally, they are responsible to change the route path if there is a problem 
and select another one that does not pass through detected malicious nodes.  
2. Forward node, represents the intermediate node between source and destination that 
receives sent packets from source and forwards them to destination. There may be 
more than one forward node along a route path between source and destination. We 
have modified the forward or intermediate nodes to perform different functions 
according to the used model (Aack, Tack, or Thack) of the A3ACKs mechanism. 
Thus, if the A3ACKs mechanism works in the default Aack model, the forward nodes 
have to work only as regular nodes with basic function of DSR protocol by 
forwarding the received packets to next hop in an active route path.  However, if the 
A3ACKs mechanism works in Tack model, they have to work according to the Tack 
model where every three consecutive nodes in a route path work together as group 
and the third node which is two hops away from the first one is required to send back 
acknowledgement packet (Tack) to the firs node in that group within predefined 
timeout as explained in section 3.4.1.2. On the other hand, if the A3ACKs mechanism 
works in Thack model, the forward nodes have to work according to the Thack model 
where every four consecutive nodes in a route path work together as group and the 
fourth node which is three hops away from the first one is required to send back 
acknowledgment packet (Thack) to the first node in that group with predefined 
timeout as explained in section 3.4.1.3.  
We conclude that the A3ACKs mechanism works most of the time in the Aack 
default model and forward nodes work only as regular DSR protocol nodes by 
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forwarding received packets to next hop. As a result, the A3ACKs mechanism saves 
energy consumption, which is significant factor in MANETs.  It saves memory space 
as well because there is no need to save packet ID and sending time at every 
intermediate node along a route path when the A3ACKs mechanism works in the 
Aack default model as explained in section 3.4.1.1. Figure 3-7 shows the forward or 
intermediate node activity or function in the A3ACKs mechanism. 
 
Figure  3-7: Forward Node activity. 
 
3. Destination node, which represents the final destination of received packets. We also 
have modified the destination nodes to perform different functions according to the 
used model (Aack, Tack, or Thack) of the A3ACKs mechanism. Thus, if the A3ACKs 
mechanism works in the default Aack model, the destination nodes have to send back 
only acknowledgement packet (Aack) over the active route path in opposite direction 
to the source of received data.  However, the destination node works as forward node, 
when the A3ACKs mechanism works in Tack, or Thack models as discussed, except 
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that the destination node will not saving the ID and sending time of received data 
packet since it is the final target of that data packet. In addition, the destination node 
has to send a switch packet to the source node to change its model to default Aack 
model. Details about the switch packet will discuss in next section. Figure 3-8 shows 
destination node activity or function, in the A3ACKs mechanism, when it receives 
data packet from a source node. 
 
Figure  3-8: Destination Node Activity. 
 
3.4.2.2. Misbehaving Nodes Model 
4. In this research, we use the terminology misbehaving nodes to represent both selfish 
and malicious nodes because both of them drop all data packets that pass through. 
However, they work as regular nodes by exchanging routing or information packets 
with their neighbors. Also, they cooperative with other nodes in route discovery or 
route maintenance of DSR protocol. That means, misbehaving nodes drop all data 
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packets that pass through but they forward all routing or information packets in a 
route path. Figure 3-9 shows misbehaving node activity or function, in the A3ACKs 
mechanism, when it receives data packet or routing packet from a regular node in 
active route path. More details about misbehaving nodes configuration or 
implementation in our simulation environment will be explained later in our 
methodology. 
 
Figure  3-9: Misbehaving Node Activity 
 
3.4.3. Switching System Model 
As discussed in section 3.4.1, the A3ACKs mechanism is a hybrid system consists 
of three models (Aack, Tack and Thack) and it needs a dynamic technique to switch 
between these three models. Thus, we proposed dynamic switch system that enables 
source node to switch between these three models. Regards the Internet draft of DSR 
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protocol [37], there is a six bits reserved in the DSR fixed portion header as shown in 
Figure 3-10. The fixed portion of the DSR header is used to carry information that must 
be present in any DSR header. In A3ACKs mechanism, we use 2 bits from these 6 bits in 
order to classify different packet types for the three models of A3ACKs scheme. 
 
Figure  3-10: Internet Draft of DSR Protocol Header Format [37] 
 
Table 3-1 shows details about different flag packet types for the three models in the 
proposed A3ACKs mechanism. 
Packet Type Aack Packet Tack Packet Thack Packet 
Packet Flag 01 10 11 
 
Table  3-1: Packet Type Indicators of A3ACKs scheme 
 
The sender node specifies packet type depending on active model as well as it is 
responsible to switch between these models according to dynamic switching system 
procedure as shown in Figure 3-11. 
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Figure  3-11: Dynamic Switch System Procedure of A3ACKs scheme. 
 
In A3ACKs technique, each node in the network operates in three models, named, Aack, 
Tack and Thack as disused before. Therefore, switching system is used to enable the 
source node to switch between these three models. However, the default model is the 
Aack mode; that means the source node starts working in Aack model to reduce network 
routing overhead until it faces timeout event. Then, it switches to Tack model to detect if 
there are any misbehaving nodes in active route path. It continue works in Tack model 
until it receives either acknowledgment packet (Tack) or alarm then it switches to Aack 
model again.   Otherwise, the source node has to switch to Thack model to detect if there 
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are any consecutive collaborative misbehaving nodes in active roué path. Also, it 
continues working in Thack model until it receives either acknowledge-ment packet 
(Thack) or alarm then it switches to Aack model again.  
By using the switching system, the intermediate nodes can be known what the 
flow model is. That means, the intermediate nodes can decide whether they have to just 
forward the packet (in case of Aack model) or they have to send Tack packet to the 
previous two haps node (in case of Tack model) , or they have to send Thack packet to 
the previous three hops node (in case of Thack model). Details about switch system 
procedure of the A3ACKs technique are presented in the above Figure 3-11. 
3.4.4. Timeout Threshold 
Timeout threshold is a very significant element and its value affects the accuracy 
of the used detection system. So if it is too large, the misbehaving nodes will have more 
chance to drop more packets. However, if it is too small, it could reduce network 
performance sharply due to increase the false alarms inside the network. In this research, 
we compare our new technique A3ACKs with the existing AACK technique. So, we need 
to evaluate both of the existing AACK and the new A3ACKs techniques. The AACK 
technique consists of two models: the first model is TWOACK model, which is similar to 
TWOACK technique where the third node must send back an acknowledgement packet 
to the first node in every three consecutive nodes along the path. The second model is 
End-To-End model (AAck) where the destination node must send back an 
acknowledgement packet to the source node that sent the received data packet. As a 
result, the AACK technique has two timeout thresholds: one for first model and another 
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for second model. The timeout threshold of the first model is identical to timeout 
threshold of TWOACK technique (TAckTout), which it is defined as the period of time 
from sending a data packet to receiving the acknowledgment of the same data packet. 
This timeout was calculated by Al-Rouby [29] experimentally and the average value is 
taken. It was set to TAckTout = 0.2 second. However, the timeout threshold in second 
model, named AAckTout, is a variable depends on the number of hops in a path from 
source to destination. It was calculated by Al-Robai [29] according to equation 3-1: 
         
        
 
                …………. ( 3-1) 
On the other hand, the A3ACKs technique has three models: End-To-End 
Acknowledgement model (Aack), two acknowledgement model (Tack) and three 
Acknowledgement model (Thack) as discussed. The procedures for both Aack and Tack 
models are similar as the End-To-End model and TWOACK model respectively in the 
AACK technique. Thus; the timeout thresholds of the Aack model and Tack models in 
the A3ACKs scheme are same as the timeout thresholds in the AACK technique. As a 
result, Tack model timeout threshold of A3ACKs scheme is set to 0.2 second and Aack 
model timeout threshold of A3ACKs scheme is calculated according to equation 3-2: 
         
        
 
                …………. ( 3-2) 
However, the procedure in Thack model of A3ACKsscheme works as follow: the fourth 
node must send back an acknowledgement packet to the first node in every four 
consecutive nodes along a route path. Therefore, the timeout threshold of Thack model in 
A3ACKs technique can be calculated according to equation 3-3: 
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    ………………………….  ( 3-3) 
Where 3 represents the number of hops in Thack model over it the acknowledgement 
packet is sent back by fourth node in ever four consecutive nodes along a route path in 
the A3ACKs technique. 
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4 CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION 
This chapter discusses our simulation environment including simulator description, 
simulation methodology and simulation configuration as well. In addition, it presents the 
used metrics to evaluate our network performance. Moreover, it shows details about our 
simulation results and discussion. Lastly, conclusion and future work are presented at the 
end of this chapter.  
4.1. Simulation Environment 
In this section, we describe the simulator tool, simulation methodology and simulation 
configuration as well. 
4.1.1. Simulator Description 
To demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed system, we implemented it using 
Network Simulator-2 (NS-2) version 2.34. NS-2 is a flexible, open source, and free 
simulator tool. It is a good simulation tool for researchers and the most common 
simulator used for MANETs [39]. The simulator is written in C++; it uses OTcl as a 
command and conﬁguration interface. NS v2 has three substantial changes from NS v1 as 
follow: (1) the more complex objects in NS v1 have been moved into simpler 
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components for greater ﬂexibility and compensability; (2) the conﬁguration interface is 
now OTcl, an object oriented version of Tcl; and (3) the interface code to the OTcl 
interpreter is separate from the main simulator. The benefits of this design come from the 
execution speed of the C++ compiled network objects and rapid reconfigure-ability of 
interpreted OTcl configuration objects. As a result, it is convenient to have a fast 
reconfigurable simulator as the foundation for using the dual interpreter/compiled class 
hierarchy. If there are changes in OTcl simulation parameters, there are no need to 
recompile; thus, a researcher can run large sets of simulation with a one-time compilation 
of the C++ network objects. Moreover, the control parameters and functions of the C++ 
compiled objects are exposed to the OTcl interpreter through OTcl linkage. Furthermore, 
for every OTcl object invoked in the interpreter hierarchy there is a mirrored object 
created in the C++ hierarchy. Lastly, NS-2 simulator can be downloaded directly from 
NS-2 website. More details about NS-2 can be found NS-2 documentation [39]. Figure 4-
1 shows a survey of simulation-based papers in ACM’s international Symposium on 
Mobile Ad Hoc networking and computing conference 2000-2005 [38]. 
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Figure  4-1: Simulator usage survey of simulation-based papers [38]. 
 
4.1.2. Simulation Methodology 
In order to evaluate and compare the performance of the A3ACKs technique under 
different types of attacks, we test the A3ACKS under two types of networks: low speed 
and high speed networks. The low speed network represents the pedestrian where the 
specified speed of mobile nodes inside network is 1 meter per second. However, the high 
speed network represents the car motion where the specified speed of mobile nodes 
inside network is 20 meter per second. Lastly, we implemented two scenarios settings in 
each network (low speed network and high speed network) to simulate different types of 
misbehaving nodes in our simulation environment. 
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 First Scenario: In this scenario, we simulate a basic packet dropping attacks, where 
misbehaving nodes drop all data packets they receive. The goal of this scenario is to 
show the principle actions of A3ACKs technique. This scenario also tests the 
performance of our A3ACKs IDS technique against receiver collision and limited 
transmission power weaknesses of Watchdog IDS, without the presence of 
collaborative attacks.  
 Second Scenario: In this scenario, we simulate smart collaborative packet dropping 
attacks, where misbehaving nodes cooperate to drop data packets they receive. And 
also send back acknowledgement (Tack packet) to sender that is two hops away from 
them in opposite direction to route path, whenever it is possible. The purpose of this 
scenario is to test the performance of the A3ACKs IDS technique against the three 
weaknesses of watchdog IDS including receiver collision, limited transmission power 
and collaborative attacks within the presence of two consecutive misbehaving nodes 
in a route path. 
4.1.3. Simulation Configuration 
The simulation environment is created using Network Simulator (NS2), version 2.34 on 
Ubuntu 10.10 operating system. This system run on laptop with Core 2Duo CPU and 
4GB-RAM. We adopted the default scenario setting in NS 2.34 to compare our 
simulation results with other existing research works. We configured our NS2 2.34 
simulation environment to contain 50 nodes scattered on a flat area with size of 900 x 900 
m. Physical layer and 802.11 MAC layer are also included in the wireless extension of 
NS2. The mobility mode is Random Waypoint with pause time equal zero. There are two 
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Moving speeds: one for low speed network and another for high speed network. In low 
speed network, the moving speed of mobile node is 1 m/s, but in high speed network the 
moving speed is 20m/s. User Datagram Protocol (UDP) traffic with Constant Bit Rate 
(CBR) of 4 packets per second is used with a packet size equals to 512 Byte. In each 
technique and for every network scenario, we run the NS simulation ten times with fixed 
simulation time equals to 900s with different seed numbers from 1 to 10. Then, we 
calculated the average value. The misbehaving nodes generated and scattered randomly 
from 0% to 40% with 10% scale increments. Details about simulation’s parameters are 
shown in Table 4-1. 
Parameter Value 
Number of nodes 50 nodes 
Simulation area 900 meter X 900 meter 
Simulation time 900 second 
Mobility model  Random waypoint with pause time 0  
Maximum speed (mobility speed) 1m/s for low speed network and 20m/s for high 
speed network 
Traffic type CBR (Constant Bit Rate) 
Packet size 512 bytes 
Packet rate 4 packets per second 
59 
 
Maximum connections 10 
Propagation model Two-ray ground model 
Antenna model  Omni-directional  
Transmission range 250 meter 
MAC protocol  802.11 CSMA/CA 
Link Bandwidth 2 Mbps 
Routing protocol  Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
 
Table  4-1: Details of Simulation Parameters. 
 
4.2. Performance Metrics 
In order to evaluate and compare simulation performance of the A3ACKs IDS, we use the 
two metrics [12, 16]: 
 Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): It defines the ratio of the number of received packets at 
destination node to the number of sent packets by the source node as shown in 
equation 4-1. 
                    (   )  
∑                                
∑                       
…… 4-1) 
 Routing Overhead (RO): It defines the ratio of routing related packets [Route 
Request (RREQ), Route Reply (RREP), Route Error (RERR), Aack, Tack, Thack, 
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alarm and switch] in bytes to the total routing and data transmissions in bytes as 
shown in equation 4-2.  
                       (   )  
∑               
∑                    ∑                     
  … ( 4-2) 
That means, network routing overhead includes: Route Request (RREQ) packet 
which is a broadcast packet sent by a source node to all the neighbors within its 
communication range. Route Reply (RREP) packet which is an unicast packet sent by 
the target destination node to the source node that sent the RREQ packet when the 
destination node receives the RREQ packet. Route Error (RERR), which is a packet 
sent to the source node that sent the RREQ packet when a failed node is detected due 
to broken link in DSR routing protocol. Aack packet which is a packet sent by 
destination node to the source node in End to End mode of A3ACK and AACK 
schemes. Tack packet which is a packet sent by a third node that is two hops away 
from the source node in every three consecutive nodes in A3ACK and AACK 
schemes. Thack packet which is a packet sent by a fourth node that is three hops 
away from the source node in every four consecutive nodes in A3ACK scheme. Alarm 
packet which is a packet generated by DSR protocol generally indicates detection of 
misbehaving node in a route path. Finally, switch packet which is a packet sent by 
destination node to a source node telling him to switch to Aack mode in A3ACKs 
scheme.  
4.3. Simulation Results and Discussion 
To evaluate the results of the new A3ACKS IDS technique and provide the readers 
with more clarifications on our simulation’s results as well as to show the effect of 
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collaborative attacks on MANETs’ performance, we compare the performance of the 
A3ACKs scheme against the AACK existing IDS technique for both low speed and high 
speed networks. Lastly, we end this section with comparison between the results of low 
and high speed networks to see the effect of mobility changing on our new IDS technique 
comparing with other existing IDSs, i.e. AACK. 
4.3.1. Low Speed Network Simulation Results 
The low speed network represents the pedestrian where the specified speed of mobile 
node is 1 meter per second. The simulation results of low speed network for both 
scenarios, as explained in our methodology, are presented in Table 4-2 where MN refers 
to misbehaving nodes. 
     Low Mobility- Scenario 1 (Single attack) : Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) 
  0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
AACK without collaborative attacks 0.9942614 0.8829214 0.8317173 0.735389 0.696997 
A3ACKs without collaborative attacks 0.9942614 0.8773666 0.8348631 0.7529527 0.7019225 
Low Mobility- Scenario 1 (Single attack) : Routing Overhead (RoH) 
  0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
AACK without collaborative attacks 0.11158755 0.13990378 0.14474138 0.17392723 0.19624141 
A3ACKs without collaborative attacks 0.115063848 0.14233643 0.14862111 0.16760948 0.20164842 
     Low Mobility - Scenario 2 (Collaborative attacks) : Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) 
  0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
      AACK with collaborative attacks 0.9942614 0.9296658 0.9006466 0.8287053 0.8151953 
A3ACKs with collaborative attacks 0.9942614 0.9696658 0.9406466 0.9287053 0.9351953 
Low Mobility - Scenario 2 (Collaborative attacks): Routing Overhead (RoH) 
  0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
       AACK with collaborative attacks 0.14797643 0.15769441 0.16341925 0.18487654 0.18003621 
   A3ACKs with collaborative attacks 0.14508353 0.17418731 0.17050975 0.18574344 0.20303621 
 
Table  4-2: Details of Low Speed Network Simulation’s results 
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Low Speed Network Scenario 1: Simulation Results 
In this scenario, as discussed, misbehaving nodes drop all data packets they received. The 
goal of this scenario is to prove the principle of how the new A3ACKs IDS technique 
works against the receiver collision and limited transmission power problems and 
compare the results with existing AACK technique. Figure 4-2 shows the results of 
network performance of packets delivery ratio (PDR) vs. misbehaving nodes (MN) ratio.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  4-2: Comparison PDR vs. MN ratio in Low Speed Networks for scenario 1 
 
We observe that packets delivery ratio of AACK and A3ACKs schemes almost the same. 
It decreases as the ratio of misbehaving nodes increases; because both of AACK and 
A3ACKs use the same mechanism to deal with no collaborative attacks (single attack). 
As a result, we conclude that both of the AACK and A3ACKs schemes are able to detect 
misbehaving nodes against the receiver collision and limited transmission. 
The results of network routing overhead (RoH) vs. misbehavior nodes ratio in scenario 1 
are shown in Figure 4-3. In general, we observe that the routing overhead ratio of AACK 
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and A3ACKs schemes almost close together and it increases with the increase of the ratio 
of misbehaving nodes. This is again because both of the techniques use the same 
mechanism to deal with a single misbehaving node in a route path.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  4-3: Comparison RoH vs. MN ratio in Low Speed Networks for scenario 1 
 
Low Speed Network Scenario 2: Simulation Results  
In this scenario, as discussed, smart collaborative misbehaving nodes cooperate with each 
other to drop data packets they receive and send back acknowledgement (Tack) packet to 
the senders that are two hops away from them, in an opposite path direction, whenever it 
is possible. The purpose of this scenario is to test the performance of the A3ACKs IDS 
technique against the receiver collision, limited transmission power as well as the 
collaborative attacks, within the presence of two consecutive misbehaving nodes in a 
path.  And then, compare the achieved results with an existing AACK technique. Figure 
4-4 shows the results of network performance of packets delivery ratio (PDR) vs. 
misbehaving nodes ratio for scenario 2. 
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Figure  4-4: Comparison PDR vs. MN ratio in Low Speed Networks for scenario 2 
 
We observe that the packets delivery ratio of the A3ACKs scheme slightly outperforms 
the AACK scheme when the percentage of the misbehaving nodes is small (i.e., 10% and 
20%). Whereas, the packets delivery ratio of the A3ACKs scheme is better than the 
AACK scheme by approximately 11% and 12% especially when the percentage of the 
misbehaving nodes are 30% and 40% respectively. As a result, we conclude that only 
A3ACKs scheme is able to detect misbehaving nodes against receiver collision, limited 
transmission and collaborative attacks within the presence of two consecutive 
misbehaving nodes in a route path, unlike AACK scheme. 
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Figure  4-5: Confidence Interval for PDR vs. M N ratio in Low Speed Networks for scenario 2 
 
Figure 4-5 compares the confidence interval of the A3ACKs and the AACK schemes for 
PDR with 95% confidence. It clear from the figure that the values of confidence interval 
are more accurate when the ratio of MNs decreases. Because of packets dropping 
decreases when MNs ratio decreases. 
 
 
Figure  4-6: PDR vs. MN ratio in Low Speed Networks for Scenario 2 with Different Transmission Range 
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Figure 4-6 shows that the PDR of the A3ACKs and AACK schemes increases when the 
value of transmission range increases. It could be as result of greater transmission range 
leads to greater transmission distances can be achieved. As a result, more packets will be 
delivered because mobile nodes can communicate within large transmission range. 
The results of network routing overhead (RoH) vs. misbehavior ratio in scenario 2 are 
shown in Figure 4-7. In general, the routing overhead of the AACK and A3ACK schemes 
are increased by increasing the percentage of misbehaving nodes. However, we observe 
that the routing overhead ratio of the A3ACKs scheme is higher than the AACK scheme, 
especially when the percentage of the misbehaving nodes is at 40%. We generalize that 
as result of introduction of the Thack mode in A3ACKs technique. That means, the 
A3ACKs scheme switches to Thack mode to detect collaborative misbehaving nodes in a 
route path and this leads to increase its overhead more than AACK scheme. 
 
Figure  4-7: Comparison RoH vs. MN ratio in Low Speed Networks for scenario 2 
 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
       AACK with collaborative attacks     A3ACKs with collaborative attacks
Low Mobility: (Scenario 2): RoH 
MN 
R
o
H
 
67 
 
Figure 4-8 compares the confidence interval of the A3ACKs and the AACK schemes for 
routing overhead with 95% confidence. We observe that the values of confidence interval 
are more accurate when the ratio of MNs decreases. Because there is more RoH produced 
when MNs ratio increases. 
  
 
Figure  4-8: Confidence Interval for RoH vs. MN ratio in Low Speed Networks for scenario 2 
 
 
 
Figure  4-9: RoH vs. MN ratio in Low Speed Networks for Scenario 2 with Different Transmission Range 
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Figure 4-9 shows that the RoH of the A3ACKs and the AACK schemes increases when 
the value of transmission range decreases. It could be as result of less transmission range 
leads to less transmission distances can be achieved. As a result, more packets dropped 
and more routing overhead produced. 
4.3.2. High Speed Network Simulation Results 
The high speed network represents car motion where the specified speed is 20 meter per 
second. The simulation results of high speed network for both scenarios, as explained in 
our methodology, are presented in Table 4-3 where MN refers to misbehaving nodes. 
               High Mobility - Scenario 1 (Single attack) : Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) 
  0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
   AACK without collaborative attacks 0.9843134 0.7088881 0.5434132 0.4244745 0.3852435 
A3ACKs without collaborative attacks 0.9843134 0.7006484 0.5368222 0.421733 0.3847024 
High Mobility - Scenario 1 (Single attack) : Routing Overhead (RoH) 
  0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
    AACK without collaborative attacks 0.1293531 0.134682 0.1807414 0.2641265 0.4703682 
A3ACKs without collaborative attacks 0.1293531 0.12564157 0.17836331 0.2526122 0.4966829 
High Mobility - Scenario 2 (Collaborative attacks) : Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) 
  0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
      AACK with collaborative attacks 0.9843134 0.8285976 0.7063138 0.5947121 0.524068 
A3ACKs with collaborative attacks 0.9843134 0.8821178 0.7918064 0.6941413 0.6801401 
High Mobility - Scenario 2 (Collaborative attacks): Routing Overhead (RoH) 
  0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
    AACK with collaborative attacks 0.1293531 0.1356249 0.1398516 0.1750516 0.2076547 
A3ACKs with collaborative attacks 0.1293531 0.1556538 0.146925 0.18918203 0.2550042 
 
Table  4-3: Details of High Speed Network Simulation’s Results 
 
High Speed Network Scenario 1: Simulation Results 
In this scenario, misbehaving nodes drop all data packets they received. The goal of this 
scenario is to show the principle of how the new A3ACKs IDS technique works against 
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the receiver collision and limited transmission power problems and compare the results 
with the existing AACK technique. Figure 4-9 shows the results of network performance 
of packets delivery ratio (PDR) vs. misbehaving ratio.  
 
 
Figure  4-10: Comparison PDR vs. MN ratio in High Speed Networks for scenario 1 
 
We observe that packets delivery ratio of AACK and A3ACKs schemes almost the same. 
It decreases as the ratio of misbehaving nodes increases; because both of AACK and 
A3ACKs use the same mechanism to deal with no collaborative attacks (single attack). 
As a result, we conclude that both of the AACK and A3ACKs schemes are able to detect 
misbehaving nodes against the receiver collision and limited transmission. 
The results of network routing overhead (RoH) vs. misbehavior ratio in scenario 1 are 
shown in Figure 4-11. In general, we observe that the routing overhead ratio of AACK 
and A3ACKs schemes almost close together and it increases with the increase of the ratio 
of misbehaving nodes. This is again because both of the techniques use the same 
mechanism to deal with a single misbehaving node in a route path. However, the 
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A3ACKs scheme has more overhead than AACK scheme when the percentage of 
misbehaving nodes is at 40%. This could be explained as a result of switching overhead 
in A3ACK given a broken link error. 
 
 
 
Figure  4-11: Comparison RoH vs. MN ratio in High Speed Networks for scenario 1 
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4-12 shows the results of network performance of packets delivery ratio (PDR) vs. 
misbehaving ratio for scenario 2. 
 
 
Figure  4-12: Comparison PDR vs. MN ratio in High Speed Networks for scenario 2 
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transmission and collaborative attacks within the presence of two consecutive 
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more accurate when the ratio of MNs ratio decreases. Because of packets dropping 
decreases when MNs ratio decreases. 
 
Figure  4-13 : Confidence Interval for PDR vs. MN ratio in High Speed Networks for scenario 2 
 
 
Figure  4-14: PDR vs. MN ratio in Low Speed Networks for Scenario 2 with Different Transmission Range 
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will be delivered because mobile nodes can communicate within large transmission 
range. 
The results of network routing overhead (RoH) vs. misbehavior ratio in scenario 2 are 
shown in Figure 4-15. 
 
 
Figure  4-15: Comparison RoH vs. MN ratio in High Speed Networks for scenario 2 
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are more accurate when the ratio of MNs decreases. Because there is more RoH produced 
when MNs ratio increases. 
 
Figure  4-16: Confidence Interval for RoH vs. MN ratio in High Speed Networks for scenario 2 
 
 
Figure  4-17: RoH vs. MN ratio in Low Speed Networks for Scenario 2 with Different Transmission Range 
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0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
High mobility (Scenario 2): RoH 
A3ACKs with collaborative attacks
R
o
H
 
MN 
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
High mobility (Scenario 2): RoH 
    AACK with collaborative attacks
R
o
H
 
MN 
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
       AACK with CA and TR=250m
    A3ACKs with CA and TR=250m
      AACK with CA and TR=200m
   A3ACKs with CA and TR=200m
      AACK with CA and TR=150m
A3ACKs with CA and TR=150m
      AACK with CA and TR=100m
A3ACKs with CA and TR=100m
MN 
P
D
R
 
High mobility (Scenario 2): RoH 
75 
 
4.3.3. Discussion 
In this section, we compare the results of low speed and high speed networks to see the 
effect of mobility on our new A3ACK IDS technique comparing with the existing IDSs, 
i.e. AACK.  
In general, both of A3ACK and AACK techniques are acknowledgement based schemes 
and the results of them in both scenarios are better in case of low speed network than that 
in case of high speed networks; due to stability of mobile nodes in low speed network 
than that in high speed network. As a result, low packets dropped and low overhead 
produced in low speed networks than that in high speed networks. Moreover, the PDR for 
both scenarios in both low speed network and high speed network is increased when MN 
ratio increases. However, the RoH for both scenarios in both low speed network and high 
speed network is inversely proportional to MN ratio, where the RoH is increased when 
MN ratio decreases.  
Figure 4-18 compares the results of packets delivery ratio (PDR) vs. misbehaving nodes 
ratio (MN) of A3ACKs and AACK schemes for scenario 1. It is clear that the PDR of 
AACK and A3ACKs schemes almost the same in scenario 1 for low speed network and 
as well as for high speed network because both of them use the same mechanism to deal 
with single attack problem as discussed. 
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Figure  4-18: Comparison PDR vs. MN in low and high speed networks for scenario 1 
 
 Figure 4-19 compares the results of Routing overhead (RoH) vs. misbehaving nodes 
ratio (MN) of A3ACKs and AACK schemes also for scenario 1.  Again it is clear that the 
RoH of AACK and A3ACKs schemes almost the same in scenario 1 for low speed 
network and for high speed network for the same reason as mentioned above. 
 
Figure  4-19: Comparison RoH vs. MN in low and high speed networks for scenario 1 
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Figure 4-20 compares the results of packets delivery ratio (PDR) vs. misbehaving nodes 
ratio (MN) of A3ACKs and AACK schemes for scenario 2. For high speed network, 
A3ACKs slightly tops AACK scheme when MN ratio is between 10% and 20%. 
Whereas, the PDR of A3ACKs scheme outperforms AACK scheme by approximately 
11% to 16% when MN between 30% and 40% respectively. Also, for low speed network, 
A3ACKs is slightly better than AACK scheme when MN ratio is between 10% and 20%. 
However, A3ACKs surpasses AACK by about 11% and 13% when MN ratio is between 
30% and 40% respectively. The reason behind PDR for both A3ACKs and AACK 
schemes in low speed network is higher than that in high speed network is that due to the 
stability of mobile nodes in low speed network. 
 
Figure  4-20: Comparison PDR vs. MN in low and high speed networks for scenario 2 
 
Figure 4-21 compares the results of Routing Overhead (RoH) vs. misbehaving nodes 
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A3ACKs scheme is higher than AACK scheme especially at 40% MN. This could be as a 
result of using the Thack model, as previously discussed, in A3ACKs technique to detect 
collaborative MN in a path when Tack model fails to detect them. As a result, this leads 
to increase RoH of A3ACKs scheme compared with AACK scheme. However, in case of 
both low and high speed networks, AACK scheme is slightly better than A3ACKs 
scheme at 40%.  
 
Figure  4-21: Comparison RoH vs. MN in low and high speed networks for scenario 2 
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significant problems of the Watchdog technique including receiver collision, limited 
transmission power and collaborative attacks with or without the presence of 
collaborative misbehaving nodes in a route path. We tested it under both low speed and 
high speed networks using Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol. We compared the 
results against the existing AACK IDS scheme under two scenarios using NS2 simulator. 
While the performance of A3ACKs is comparable with AACK in the case of one 
misbehaving node, A3ACKs outperforms AACK in the case of collaborative attack. 
Moreover, the performance of both protocols is better under low speed network than that 
of high speed network. Although the new A3ACKs IDS has slightly high routing 
overhead, the network security is more robust and the packets delivery ratio is improved. 
To the best of our knowledge, this tradeoff is worthwhile when network security has the 
top priority in MANETs. In conclusion, the results achieved using A3ACKs IDS showed 
a promising performance especially with the presence of collaborative attacks. 
For the future work, we recommend testing A3ACKs under other types of routing 
protocols in MANETs including reactive, proactive and hybrid protocols. In addition, we 
would like to improve A3ACKs scheme to solve other weaknesses of the Watchdog IDS, 
such as misbehaving report and partial drop attacks. Finally, we suggest testing A3ACKs 
scheme in real networks instead of simulation and comparing the results.  
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